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MARYLAND MORTGAGES FOR FUTURE
ADVANCES
By R. DORSEY WATKINS*
"No one, I am sure" said Lord MacNaghten, "by the
light of nature, ever understood an English mortgage of
real estate."' This aphorism applies with equal appropri-
ateness to a type of mortgage that has been the subject of
statutory and lengthy case consideration in Maryland, and
which the recent case of Neeb v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber
Realty Co., Inc.2 shows is still of practical importance.
The validity of mortgages for future advances-mort-
gages intended to be security from their date of execution
(or recordation) for loans and advances thereafter to be
made-was well-recognized at common law.3  Their effect
was to permit the rights of the mortgagee to be determined,
as regards other lienors or encumbrancers, not by the date
or dates upon which such advance or advances were made,
but by the date (or recordation) of the mortgage itself,
subject in some cases to the question of notice to the mort-
gagee of the existence of other liens when his advance was
made, and to the further question of whether his advances
were optional or obligatory.4
Although probably intended primarily to serve as se-
curity for current balances in running accounts, or strictly
by way of indemnity of an indorser, guarantor or accom-
modation party to commercial paper, they were often the
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1922, Ph.D., 1925, Johns Hopkins
University; LL.B., 1925, University of Maryland. Lecturer on Torts,
Suretyship, and Mortgages, University of Maryland School of Law.Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Corp., [1904] A. C. 323.
5 A. (2d) 283 (Md. 1939).
'Western National Bank v. Jenkins, 131 Md. 239, 250-251, 101 A. 667, 1
A. L. R. 1577 (1917) ; Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494, 530, 71 Am. Dec. 645
(1859) ; Cole v. Albers & Runge, 1 Gill 412, 424 (Md. 1843).
4 See n. 23, in Ira.
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subject of fraudulent or at least preferential arrangements.
They might "cover a mortgagee against all future liabilities
of any and every description, which the mortgagor might
incur or be responsible for, to the mortgagee."'  In such a
case, creditors subsequent to the effective date of the mort-
gage had no way of ascertaining with certainty the out-
standing debts then secured by the mortgage, nor would
such knowledge have been of more than momentary value,
since immediately thereafter the mortgagee might make
other loans or advances which would come under the lien
of the mortgage. Moreover, while ordinarily called mort-
gages for future loans or advances, under such mortgages
containing the broad coverage above mentioned (any lia-
bility for which the mortgagor might be responsible to the
mortgagee) a mortgagee might buy up at depreciated
prices claims against the mortgagor, and under the mort-
gage acquire priority for their face amounts against other
creditors not so secured.6
As explained in Cole v. Albers,' the first important case
arising after legislation in Maryland on this question, a
practice
"prevailed ... of taking mortgages for specified sums
of money, greatly below the value of the mortgaged
premises, with a clause or clauses providing that the
mortgaged premises should be held as a security for
all future liabilities or advances by the mortgagee to
the mortgagor, by which means the creditors of the
mortgagor were defrauded, sometimes by fraudulent
combinations between the mortgagor and mortgagee,
or by the acts of the mortgagee alone, who, after the
known insolvency of the mortgagor, purchased up lia-
bilities of the mortgagor at depreciated rates, and held
them as liens on the mortgaged premises for their
nominal amounts; thus excluding a portion of the
creditors from an equal dividend of the mortgagor's
estate. Creditors becoming such after date of such
mortgage, were deluded and suffered loss, which no
precaution could guard them against."





This possibility, and apparently reality, of abuse, led to
the passage of a statute in 1825 which reads as follows: a
"That no mortgage, or deed of that nature, that may
be executed after the first day of August, one thousand
eight hundred and twenty-six, shall operate or be con-
strued to operate, either in law or in equity, as a lien
or charge, on any estate or property whatsoever, for
any other or different principal sum or sums of money
than the principal sum or sums that shall appear on
the face of such mortgage, and be specified and recited
therein, and particularly mentioned and expressed to
be secured thereby, at the time of executing the same."
It is to be noted that its terms were applicable to mort-
gages generally, and that it did not attempt to invalidate
mortgages for future loans or advances to, or obligations of,
the mortgagor, but only to fix, at the time of the mortgage,
the maximum amount for which it could be held as secur-
ity. It at least put the subsequent creditor on his guard,
and warned him of the possible total amount for which
the mortgage might be a prior lien.'
The Court in Cole v. Albers,9 in construing an instru-
ment,10 intended to secure present and future advances to
a fixed amount, succinctly stated the purpose of the Act,
and the result accomplished by it, as follows:
"The design of the law-makers in the passage of the
Act of 1825, Ch. 50, was to prevent liens on property,
to the prejudice of creditors, for amounts and claims
never contemplated by the parties at the time of its
execution, and of which the deed, by its terms, gave no
notice . . . Such transactions the law was designed to
meet; but not a case like this, where the amount is
stated; where the world is apprised of its limits, and
where the parties design to cover all advances which
may be made, to the extent of the sum limited in the
mortgage. In the mortgage, now under consideration,
no one could be deceived or prejudiced."
7
a Md. Laws 1825, Ch. 50. This is substantially the same as the first
clause of the present Md. Code (1924) Art. 66, Sees. 2, 3.
8 The mortgage of course would be a lien only for its face amount or
the amount due the mortgagee, whichever was smaller.
1 Gill 412, 424 (Md. 1843).
1o Called a "bill of sale" in the statement of facts, 1 Gill 418; a "deed of
mortgage", 420; a deed, 422.
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The Act was so strictly construed by the Chancellor in
Re Young1 that in foreclosure proceedings he refused to
allow the mortgagees, in addition to the principal sum, any
further sum for "costs, charges or commissions", although
the mortgage expressly contained such a stipulation. The
mortgagees were held to be limited to "the sum which,
upon the face of the instrument, is specifically secured by
it."' 2  When this question came before the Court of Ap-
peals in Maus v. McKellip 8 a different conclusion was
reached, and counsel fees and costs were recognized as ex-
penses properly to be allowed in foreclosure. The Court
said:
"It will thus be seen that although the Act of 1825,
codified in Article 64 of the Code, was directed against
any other or different principal sum or sums of money
than the principal sum or sums that shall appear on
the face of the mortgage, that is, against new loans
or debts, not contemplated by the parties at the time
of the execution of the mortgage, but contracted sub-
sequently and attached to the original debt by a new
and springing contract between the parties, yet there
is nothing in the terms of the Act, either in its letter or
spirit preventing a mortgagor from covenanting to pay
in addition to the debt such costs and charges as the
mortgagee may be obliged to incur in the collection of
the same."14
No cases of any significance 15 followed until the leading
"3 Md. Ch. 461, 473-474 (1851).12 Ibid., 474.
"38 Md. 231 (1873).1 4 Ibid., 237.
15In Claggett v. Salmon, 5 G. & J. 314 (Md. 1833) and Markell v. Eichel-
berger, 12 Md. 78 (1858) the validity of indemnity mortgages, the first of
which, at least, contemplated future advances, was not raised. Fouke v.
Fleming, 13 Md. 392 (1859) construed a "deed of trust, or quasi mortgage"
for indemnity, and turned upon an unrelated point.
The Court was also required to determine whether or not the early
Building and Loan Association member mortgages, not providing for the
repayment of a designated sum, but for weekly or monthly payments until
such time as there should be sufficient money in hand to pay each unre-
deemed share of its stock, were violative of the Act of 1825, for failure
to state the amount secured (repayable). It was decided that since the
Act of 1852, Ch. 148, authorizing such associations, permitted mortgages in
that form, the Act of 1825 was thereby repealed to the extent of any
inconsistency. Robertson v. American Homestead Association, 10 Md. 397,
408, 69 Am. Dec. 145 (1857); Franz v. Teutonia Bldg. Assn., 24 Md. 259,
270 (1866). The question has also arisen since the Act of 1872, inftra. It
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decision of Wilson v. Russell.1sa In that case the facts,
somewhat simplified, were that Wilson had agreed to lend
to Mason & Son, "promissory notes, from time to time, as
may be desired by said firm" to an aggregate amount of
$36,000 during three years from the date of the first loan,
and $18,000 during the fourth year. The notes were to
mature in six months and were "to be regularly taken up
and retired at maturity" before new notes were issued.
Mason & Son also agreed to pay Wilson an amount of
money equal to five per cent. on the amount of each such
note, to be applied on account of an old debt to Wilson
discharged in insolvency. A deed of trust was executed
by Mason & Son to secure Wilson "from all loss and injury
in the premises" and also to secure the five per cent. pay-
ments. The deed of trust was promptly recorded. Later
Mason & Son sold the property covered by the deed of trust,
taking notes for the purchase price secured by a bond of
conveyance, promptly recorded. Some of the appellees
were holders of these notes, and claimed that at the time
of the receipt thereof, they had no "knowledge or notice
that any advances had been made under the" deed of trust,
if in fact any had. The evidence clearly established that
one series of notes was issued by Wilson immediately upon
the execution of the deed of trust. These had been paid,
and at the time of the execution and recording of the bond
of conveyance a second series was outstanding. There-
after these were paid, a third series lent and paid, and a
fourth series issued and unpaid. Various questions were
raised, including the validity of a mortgage in which the
date of the first advance was not stated so as to fix the
duration of the mortgage, and were decided adversely to
the appellees. The question was clearly presented as to
is believed that these cases also are confined to the exemption of such mort-
gages from the application of the first clause only of Art. 66, Sec. 2-speci-
fication of the principal sum the mortgage is intended to secure-and do not
hold that such mortgages are exempt from the provisions generally appli-
cable to mortgages for future advances. Appeal Tax Court v. Rice, 50 Md.
302, 318 (1879) ; Loan & Savings Assn. v. Tracey, 142 Md. 211, 215, 120 A.
441 (1923) ; Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Lumber Co., 168 Md. 199, 203, 178 A.
214 (1935).15a 13 Md. 494 (1859).
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the priority between advances under a prior recorded in-
strument intended to cover future advances, but in which
the advances now sought to be enforced were not actually
made until the recording of, and advances under, a subse-
quent encumbrance, and claimants under the second en-
cumbrance.
The Court considered that the requirements of the Act
of 1825 were met, as "the amounts which it was intended
to secure are expressed in the deed, as required . . ." Nor
was there any question as to the validity of instruments to
secure future loans and advances, "if unexceptionable in
other respects".
The Court, in giving retroactive effect to the subsequent
advances under the prior lien, placed great reliance upon
the case of Gordon v. Graham.15b The quotation from that
case is as follows:
"A. mortgages to B. for a term of years to secure
the sum of ........................ already lent to the mortgagor,
as also such other sums as should hereafter be lent, or
advanced to him. Afterwards A. makes a second mort-
gage to C. for a certain sum, with notice of the first
mortgage, and then the first mortgagee having notice
of the second mortgage, lends a further sum, etc. The
question was, upon what terms the second mortgagee
shall redeem the first mortgage?
"Cowper, Lord Chancellor, held, 'that the second
mortgagee shall not redeem the first mortgage, without
paying all that is due, as well the money lent after, as
that lent before the second mortgage was made; for
it was the folly of the second mortgagee, with notice,
to take such a security.'"
The Court referred to Spader v. Lawler,15 as the only
case to the contrary, but itself containing a strong dissent,16
and concluded:
11 b 7 Vin. Abr. 52 E. Plac. 3, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 598.
"c 17 Ohio 371 (1848).
1" The question was whether or not a prior mortgage, with a clause cover-
Ing "any other sum, or sums of money which the said [mortgagor] may be
owing, or indebted to" the mortgagee, would be subordinate to a second
mortgage, where the original loan had been repaid and the advances claimed
for were made after the recording of the second mortgage. According to
[VOL. IV
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"Upon this question there is some conflict of author-
ity, but after an examination of the cases cited at the
bar, and some others, we are of the opinion that the
weight of authority sustains the principal of Gordon v.
Graham.
"If the junior creditor may, 'by inspection of the
record, and by common prudence, ascertain the extent
of the incumbrance', the first incumbrance must pre-
vail."
The case is an interesting one, both from what it decides
and what it ignores.
1. The instrument being construed is described as, and
has the characteristics of, a deed of trust. It is, however,
indifferently called a deed of trust or a deed "in the nature
of a mortgage". It certainly was not a technical mort-
gage, 7 although the whole discussion was based upon the
law of mortgages. If it were simply a deed of trust, the
provisions of the Act of 1825, and of the provisions of
Article 66, even before the amendment of Sections 2 and 3
in 1924, would have been inapplicable."8
2. Nothing is said about whether or not the advances
made by Wilson after the bond of conveyance were made
with knowledge or notice of this conveyance. The bill of
complaint stressed the plaintiffs' lack of knowledge of ad-
vances by Wilson, but made no point of his knowledge or
notice of their encumbrance. The answer of the trustees
the counsel for the appellee, "the only notice on either side was that result-
ing from the recording of the mortgages." (p. 377)
The majority opinions pointed out that in Ohio recording Is "a part of
the execution" of a mortgage, and it was questionable if a clause for future
advances was of any effect whatever. Equitable mortgages were not recog-
nized (p. 378), and a subsequent mortgagee with knowledge of an unre-
corded prior mortgage would therefore be preferred if he recorded his
mortgage first (p. 379). The first mortgagee was therefore bound by
notice of the second mortgage from its recording.
The dissent felt that the burden should be on the second lienor to ascer-
tain "the extent of the incumbrance at the time he makes his loan", and
that if the subsequent mortgagee wished to bind the first mortgagee, he
should give actual notice.
"7 Bank of Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 396, 409 (1876).
"That a deed of trust is not a mortgage within the provisions of Md.
Code (1924) Article 66, and its predecessors, has often been held. Eisinger
Mill, etc. Co. v. Dillon, 159 Md. 185, 190, 158 A. 267, 269-270 (1930) ; Kinsey
v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 230, 126 A. 125, 126 (1924) (recording statutes);
Dudley v. Roberts, 144 Md. 155, 124 A. 883 (1923) ; Dlggs v. Fidelity and
Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50, 72, 75 A. 517, 521 (1910); Bank of Commerce v.
Lanahan, 45 Md. 396, 408-9 (1876).
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under the deed of trust in favor of Wilson expressly denied
knowledge by them of the subsequent sale and bond of
conveyance. The answer of Wilson seems carefully to
avoid this point.
The failure of the Court to discuss this phase may per-
mit any of several possible inferences.
a. It may have been considered immaterial; i. e., ad-
vances by the prior mortgagee, with or without knowledge
of the second encumbrance, would be entitled to the bene-
fit of the lien of the first mortgage.
b. The Court may have assumed that the first mort-
gagee necessarily had constructive notice of the second en-
cumbrance, but was unaffected by that notice. The con-
struction of Section 25 of Article 66, enacted in 1892, shows
that, contrary to the usual rule,19 the holder of a recorded
interest in mortgaged land may be charged with notice of
subsequently recorded instruments.20  The enactment of
the Act of 1892, and the strong reliance placed upon it in
the cases cited in the preceding footnote may, however, in-
dicate a contrary result.
c. The significance of notice to the prior mortgagee
may not have been realized.
The conclusion of the writer, however, is that the Court
intended to adopt the rule it believed was established in
Gordon v. Graham,21 that the prior mortgagee under a
mortgage with a clause for future advances, may make
them whether or not he has knowledge or notice of a subse-
quent lien, and that advances so made are covered by the
lien of his mortgage (provided, of course, the maximum
principal amount is set forth). Such would seem to be the
conclusion of the headnote writer also.
3. No discussion occurs as to whether the rule of Gor-
don v. Graham22 applies whether the making of future ad-
1 Recording is notice to subsequent encumbrances only. 1 JONES, I1ORT-
GAGES (8th Ed. 1928) Secs. 453, 456; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 256.20 Cade v. Dukes, 159 Md. 308, 150 A. 807 (1930) ; Ibid., 157 Md. 45, 145
A. 222 (1929) ; Sennett v. Taylor, 157 Md. 107, 111, 145 A. 358, 360 (1929) ;
Bowen v. Kelbaugh, 147 Md. 364, 128 A. 37 (1925); Churchville Circuit v.
MacNabb, 145 Md. 105, 125 A. 526 (1924).




vances is optional with, or obligatory upon, the mort-
gagee.2s Here again no certain conclusion can be drawn.
a. Gordon v. Graham, as quoted, clearly makes no dis-
tinction between the rights of the mortgagee in either case.
b. The undertaking here could fairly be construed
as obligatory-Wilson agreed to lend his notes "from time
to time, as may be desired by said firm of Mason & Son" up
to a stated maximum at any time.
4. The Court considers Gordon v. Graham to have been
accepted as authority, construes the doubts expressed by a
famous authority on mortgages 24 as overcome by his final
conclusions. The Court pointed out that Chancellor Kent's
suggested limitation2 5 to cases in which a subsequent judg-
ment or mortgage had not intervened, was reconsidered in
his Commentaries where he said: 21
"So a mortgage or judgment may be taken, and
held as a security for future advances and responsibili-
ties, to the extent of it, when this is a constituent part
of the original agreement, and the future advances will
be covered by the lien, in preference to the claim under
a junior intervening incumbrance, with notice of the
agreement."
The case of Gordon v. Graham was, however, reviewed
and "overruled" by the House of Lords in 1861, in the later
case of Hopkinson v. Rolt.2 7  The appellants were mort-
gagees under a mortgage from M, to secure the amounts then
due, "or at any time thereafter, should or might be due or
"8 By the great weight of American authority, in the absence of con-
trolling statutory provisions a mortgagee bound to make advances is en-
titled to priority over intermediate liens irrespective of notice. If the
future advances are optional, and not obligatory, he is postponed to inter-
vening liens of which he had actual, not merely constructive notice. 1
JONES, op. cit. supra n. 19, Sees. 4524, 456; WALSH, Op. cit. supra n. 19, 77-
80; Note, Mechanics' Liens-Priority Over Mortgage for Future Advances
(1911) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 91; Note, Mortgages-Priorities-Mortgage for
Future Advances (1909) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 68; Note, Priority of a Mortgage
to Secure Future Advances (1911) 11 Col. L. Rev. 459; Annotation, 81
A. L. R. 631; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed. 1939) Sees. 1463-64.
24 Coventry's notes to 2 POwELL, MORTGAGES, 533, 534, express some doubts
as to the decision in Gordon v. Graham, but state in conclusion that he
"individually places but slender dependence in the force of their applica-
tion."
25 In Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch. 320 (N. Y. 1821).
6 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES 175.
2"9 H. L. Cas. 514, 11 Eng. Rep. 829 (1861).
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owing to" the appellants, not to exceed a total of 20,000E.
Subsequently M mortgaged the same property to Rolt to
secure money due, or money which Rolt might be called
upon to pay on account of M. Each mortgagee had notice
of the other's mortgage. Emphasis was laid upon the fact
that advances were not obligatory. The question was ex-
pressly involved as to whether advances made by the ap-
pellants after the execution of the mortgage to Rolt, and
with knowledge of it, took priority over Rolt's mortgage.
The original record of Gordon v. Graham was re-examined,
and the Lord Chancellor (Lord Chelmsford concurring)
concluded that the case had been misreported in both re-
ports2 in that they incorrectly stated that "then the first
mortgagee, having notice of the second mortgage, lends a
farther sum"; and that in fact the amount allowed the first
mortgagee in that case did not include any advance after
notice of subsequent incumbrances. 20 In the instant case,
the provision as to future advances "secured farther ad-
vances to the amount of 20,000£, absolutely, till there
should be notice of a second mortgage and continuously
as between mortgagor and mortgagee, although there
should be a second mortgage."30 Lord Chelmsford thought
that to give Gordon v. Graham the construction for which
the appellants contended would "effectually preclude a
mortgagor from afterwards raising money in any other
quarter".8 1
Lord Cranworth, dissenting, did not agree that Gordon
v. Graham had been erroneously reported, and argued that
it had been so regularly followed that a rule of contract,
right or wrong, had been established.82 He suggested as a
possible limitation the case of a second mortgagee lending
Ibid., 9 H. L. Cas. 531-533.
29 Ibid., 533.
80 Ibid., 536.
8' Ibid., 553. The case had been heard before the Master of the Rolls (25
Beav. 461, 53 Eng. Rep. 713), then on appeal by the Chancellor, who was
then Lord Chelmsford, the decision in each instance being favorable to
Rolt. In the House of Lords two opinions for affirmance and one for
reversal were rendered. Chelmsford sitting In review of his own judgment
thus swung the balance.
89 9 H. L. Cas. 514, 540.
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upon the express promise of the mortgagor, communicated
to the first mortgagee, not to borrow any further from the
first mortgagee.18
Wilson v. Russell was, however, referred to in 1874 by
the Court of Appeals 34 as a "case which was very carefully
considered, and has been repeatedly recognized by subse-
quent decisions of this Court . . ." In 1880, the attention
of the Court was directed to the decision of Hopkinson v.
Rolt, and the contention was made that Wilson v. Russell,
resting on the overruled case of Gordon v. Graham, should
itself be overruled. The Court said, however:35
"The decision in 13 Md. does not rest, and was not
placed, solely on Gordon v. Graham; for this court,
mentioning the conflict of authority existing on the
subject, and citing the various authorities upon both
sides of the question, said that 'the weight of authority
sustained the principle established in Gordon v. Gra-
ham."'
By Ch. 213 of the Acts of 1872, an important change was
made in the law. The Act of 1825, codified as Section 2 of
Article 64 with immaterial changes in language, had placed
the simple limitation on all mortgages or deeds in the
nature of a mortgage (but not deeds of trust) 36 that they
could be security only for the principal amount 7 appearing
on the face of the mortgage and expressed as secured there-
by. The Act of 1872 provided that, except as to indemnity
mortgages and mortgages by brewers to malsters, (a) no
mortgage should be a lien for future advances except from
the time such advances are actually made, and (b) no
mortgage to secure future advances should be valid unless
the amounts and times for such advances are specifically
stated. Anne Arundel, Baltimore, St. Mary's and Prince
" Ibid., 544. The opinions reveal a more than usual depth of feeling.
Cranworth rather adroitly refers to the Master of the Rolls' erroneous
ascription of the doubt (supra, n. 24) to Powell, not Coventry. The dia-
metrically opposite construction of this doubt is reminiscent of the forensic
rather than the judicial.
:'Ahern v. White, 39 Md. 409, 421 (1874).
"Robinson v. Cons. Real Estate Co., 55 Md. 105, 108 (1880).
Supra, n. 18.
17 Or the amount due, if less.
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George's Counties were excluded from these changes and
left under the old Act exclusively. The additions (omit-
ting the reference to the excepted four counties) read as
follows:
and no mortgage, or deed in the nature of a
mortgage, shall be a lien or charge for any sum or sums
of money to be loaned or advanced after the same is
executed, except from the time said loan or advance
shall be. actually made, and no mortgage to secure
future loans or advances, shall be valid unless the
amount or amounts of the same, and the times when
they are to be made shall be specifically stated in said
mortgages, this not to apply to mortgages to indemnify
the mortgagee against loss from being indorser or
security, nor to any mortgages given by brewers to
malsters to secure the payment to the latter of debts
contracted by the former for malt and other material
used in the making of malt liquor . . ."
A later statute 7 a struck out Anne Arundel and St.
Mary's Counties from the special exception, and left only
Baltimore and Prince George's Counties subject to the Act
of 1825.
Both the Act of 1872 and the later one, by piling excep-
tion on exception, and then an exception to the exception,
presented interesting questions of statutory construction.
However, the Court of Appeals was never required to pass
upon them. After their enactment (and taking simply the
Act of 1882 to avoid repetition) the result would appear to
have been:
1. In the entire state, other than Baltimore and Prince
George's Counties, all mortgages (except indemnity, and
brewers to malsters) were required to state the maximum
principal amount to be secured, and if for future advances,
were security only from the time of such advances, which
advances had to be particularly described as to date and
amount.
Indemnity mortgages, and brewer to malster mortgages,
did not have to describe the principal amount secured;
'
7
a Md. Laws 1882, Ch. 471.
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and these two classes, if for future advances, need not de-
scribe the amount or date thereof, and were security from
the date of recording, regardless of when the advances
were made.
2. In Baltimore and Prince George's Counties, all mort-
gages, including indemnity mortgages, were subject to the
requirement that the principal amount be stated, but with-
out further limitation; i. e., were governed exclusively by
the Act of 1825.
In the Code of 1888, this one section was recodified into
two, and so it continues to the present. 38  Section 2 of
Article 66 is codified as enacted by the Act of 1882, minus
the special counties exception, and so appears to be State-
wide. Section 3 of Article 66 relates only to Baltimore and
Prince George's Counties, and enacts verbatim the first
clause of Section 2, requiring a statement of the principal
amount, but expressly excepts indemnity mortgages.
By Chapter 224 of the Laws of 1924, another exception
was added in identical language to Sections 2 and 3, as
follows:
... nor are the provisions hereof intended to
apply to deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages or
any other deeds of trust to secure bonds, notes or other
obligations."
The result may perhaps39 thus be summarized:
1. Generally, throughout the State, mortgages must
state the principal amount secured, but this does not
apply to
(a) Indemnity mortgages;
(b) Deeds of trust; and
(c) Brewer to malster mortgages (except in Balti-
more and Prince George's Counties, where the amount
must be stated).
"The Code of 1888 was enacted as law, and not simply evidence thereof,
as the later codes now serve.
.. The Acts of 1872 and 1882 by their very terms made the excepted
counties subject only to the Act of 1825. The Code of 1888 carried this
forward but as two sections, and unfortunately made Section 2 of Article
66 read as If statewide. In that case Section 3 would in effect have been
repealed. It is most improbable that if the compiler had intended to effect
a repeal he would have created a new section containing the repealed
1940]
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2. Mortgages for future advances are a lien only from
the time such advances are made, and the amounts and
times of such advances must be specifically stated, except
in the case of
(a) Indemnity mortgages;
(b) Brewer to malster mortgages;
(c) Baltimore and Prince George's Counties.
Deeds of trust are excepted, now by statute, as well as
by construction.40
Another general exception to the future advance provi-
sions is also recognized in the cases-a judgment to secure
future advances. In Neidig v. Whiteford41 the Court
found as a fact that the judgment in question had not been
intended to cover future advances, but recognized that an
agreement entered into at the time of confessing a judg-
ment could be given that effect, saying: 42
"It is now well settled that a judgment, as well as a
mortgage, may be taken to secure future advances and
liabilities when such is a constituent part of the orig-
inal agreement under which it was entered; and any
future advances, not exceeding the amount of the judg-
ment made thereunder, will be covered thereby."
This statement was followed and applied in Robinson
v. Consolidated Real Estate & Fire Ins. Co.41 In that case
language, when the repeal could have been effected by a simple omission.
The simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of Sections 2 and 3 by Md. Laws
1924, Ch. 224, was a recognition of the existence of Section 3. To give it
any effect it must constitute an exception to Section 2. This extended
discussion of what should have been obvious is required by the inconsis-
tency of an all-embracing and an exceptional provision existing simul-
taneously, and by the practical consequences in Baltimore and Prince
George's Counties. The effect of this exception was raised in the appel-
lant's brief in Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Lumber Co., 168 Md. 199, 178 A. 214
(1934), where It is stated Judge Grason held Section 2 applicable to a
mortgage of Baltimore County realty. The appellants urged that if the
mortgage were one for future advances, Section 3 was controlling, and
required only the (ultimate) principal amount to be stated. The Court of
Appeals held that the mortgage was not one for future advances and did
not mention this point. It was not raised in the Neeb case, 5 A. (2d) 283
(Md. 1939), one also from Baltimore County.40 Supra, n. 18.
1 29 Md. 178 (1868).
42 Ibid., 183.




the appellee had leased certain lots to J, a builder. Under
an agreement by which the appellee was to advance him
money from time to time for the erection of houses, J con-
fessed a judgment for $4,500, with which an agreement was
filed stating that the judgment was security for the repay-
ment "of all moneys which it [appellee] may loan or ad-
vance" to J from October 3, 1874, to January 1, 1876. A
mortgage to secure such advances, specifying the amounts
and times, was also executed, and the lease, judgment and
mortgage were recorded before any work was begun upon
the premises. Some construction work was, however,
started before any advances were actually made. In a
contest between the mortgagee-judgment creditor and the
holders of mechanics' liens, the judgment for future ad-
vances was given priority.. The Court said:
"The Act of 1872 modifying the law in respect to
mortgages to secure such advances, has no effect on a
case like the present, which is rested on the judgment
lien; the judgment having been taken for the whole
amount intended to be loaned. That judgment being
of record was notice to the world of its existence, as a
lien from its date against the property of the judgment
debtor. The lien existed, and execution could have
issued, for there is no stay of execution entered.
Equity it is true might have restrained a sale at-
tempted under it, if it appeared that the advances
forming the debts for which it was given, or no part
of them had been made. But we see no ground upon
which execution could have been refused at any time
for such advances as may have been made . . . The
lien relates to, and begins from the date of judgment
9)44
The cases dealing with mortgages executed subsequent
to the effective date of the Act of 1872 have primarily in-
volved conflicts between the mortgagee and mechanics' lien
claimants. In such cases (other than mortgages in the
"55 Md. 105, 110. A judgment is only a general lien; a mortgage is a
specific lien. Why an elusive "public policy" should place obstacles in the
way of security for future advances under mortgages, and not under judg-
ments (with a separate provision or agreement) is not discussed, and no
reason occurs to this writer.
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two excepted counties) the contest has turned upon
whether or not the mortgage in fact was one for future
advances, in which event the mechanics' lien claims would
have prevailed as to advances subsequent to the commence-
ment of work, or whether the mortgage was one in which
the amount named on the face of the mortgage had actu-
ally been advanced, or made available, at the time the mort-
gage was recorded. The possibility of such controversy
primarily arises out of the natural desire of the mortgagee,
who lends money to be used from time to time for expendi-
tures from which the greater part or perhaps all of his
security will be created, to control such expenditure along
particular lines. Specifically, if a construction loan is in-
tended, it will usually be provided that the builder-mort-
gagor will be entitled to payments, either of a designated
amount or percentage, at certain stages of completion. Re-
stricting for the present the consideration to cases in which
the security for repayment takes the form of a mortgage,
it is obvious that at least the following arrangements are
possible:
1. A mortgage for future advances may be executed
in strict compliance with the statute. In such a case the
mortgage will become a lien as to each advance only from
the time it is made, and therefore subject to intervening
liens, whether recorded, as subsequent mortgages for value,
or judgments; or mechanics' liens for work done (and in
the Counties for materials furnished) before such advance,
if subsequently perfected by proper recording in the man-
ner and within the time allowed by Article 63 of the Code.
The effect is therefore the same as if a new mortgage were
executed and recorded simultaneously with, and for the
amount of, each advance. The only real advantage, if
any,4 is that the mortgagee is saved this slight inconveni-
ence.
2. A mortgage for the full amount may be given, and
that amount actually delivered to the mortgagor, with an
"E The same examination of the record would be required in either case,
to ascertain the existence of liens.
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understanding as to its application. The honesty of the
mortgagor, and perhaps the effect of actual notice to those
dealing with him, 6 would be the only safeguards.
3. The proceeds of the mortgage may be placed with
a third person, under a trust, escrow or agency agreement,
to be distributed in accordance with the terms of a definite
agreement or understanding. Where this is really done,
the Court has had no hesitancy in holding the mortgage not
to be within the future advance provisions.47
4. The mortgagee may retain the stated principal
amount, or part thereof, to be disbursed by him in accord-
ance with a clearly defined schedule. This is regarded
with real, and justifiable, suspicion.
5. A general plan may be attempted to give the mort-
gage, really intended to secure future advances, the guise
of an indemnity mortgage.
The last three alone need be considered.
A. Where the proceeds of a mortgage are in fact placed
in the control of a third person, to be disbursed by him in
accordance with a designated plan or arrangement, the
transaction is not regarded as coming within the restric-
tions on mortgages for future advances. In such cases48
the mortgage is to secure a present loan, although the pro-
ceeds are not immediately available to the mortgagor, and
are to be advanced in the future.
Where the proceeds are at or before the execution of
the mortgage paid by the mortgagee directly or through
the mortgagor to a third person to be by him applied, the
mortgage is good as security from the date of recording for
the entire amount, even although
46 In High Grade Brick Co. v. Amos, 95 Md. 571, 52 A. 582 (1902), the
Court said that If the subsequent mechanics' lienor had known of the true
relation of the parties to a mortgage for future advances, it could not have
complained. It is doubtful, however, that funds in the hands of the mort-
gagor, although intended to be applied to specified projects only, would
have a legally protectable status different from free funds or general
assets. Cf. Frounfelter v. State, Use Carroll, 66 Md. 80, 87, 5 A. 410, 414
(1886) ; Am. Bonding Co. v. Milwaukee Co., 91 Md. 733, 742-3, 48 A. 72, 74
(1900).
47 See cases cited infra notes 49-51.8 Ibid.
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(1) There is an express understanding or agreement
that the mortgagor is immediately to deliver the proceeds
to a third person, and not directly to retain any of the
amount lent."
(2) The agreement that the proceeds are to be placed
with a third person is contemporaneous with the loan, and
is a condition precedent. °
(3) The third person is in the event of default in the
mortgage, authorized or required to apply any unexpended
balance to the payment of the mortgage debt."
B. The proceeds of the mortgage may, at least in cases
in which the mortgagee is a financial institution, be re-
tained by the mortgagee for disbursement in accordance
with a stated schedule. Whether this can be done by an
individual mortgagee is at least very doubtful, and in the
only case before the Court of Appeals in which it was at-
tempted, the Court held that such control made the mort-
gage one for future advances. In that case52 although
checks were drawn by the mortgagee for the full principal
amount, they were payable to the order of a corporation
wholly owned by the mortgagee, and one of the checks
was never deposited. They were drawn on the mort-
gagee's interest-bearing account, so that until deposited,
the title to such sums, and the accruing interest, remained
in the mortgagee. The Court referred to the arrangement
as one it could not sanction, and pointed out that "the
statute would be largely nugatory if the device adopted in
this case were held to be consistent with its terms."' 3
In three cases, however, the Court has recognized or
held that the retention of the funds by the mortgagee will
not of itself make the mortgage one for future advances.
4' Neeb v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Realty Co., 5 A. (2d) 283 (Md. 1939) ;
Land Corp. v. Loan & Sav. Ass'n., 138 Md. 529, 114 A. 469 (1921) ; Western
Nat'l. Bank v. Jenkins, 131 Md. 239, 252, 101 A. 667, 671, 1 A. L. R. 1577
(1917).
'o Ibid., and Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Lumber Co., 168 Md. 199, 204, 178 A.
214, 215 (1934).
" Neeb v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Realty Co., supra n. 49; Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n. v. Lumber Co., supra n. 50; Western Natl'l. Bank v. Jenkins, supra
n. 49.
Groh v. Cohen, 158 Md. 638, 643, 149 A. 459, 461 (1930).
Ibid., 158 Md. 644, 149 A. 461.
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In Edelhoff v. Horner-Miller Mfg. Co.54 the Court referred
to the fact that the principal sum secured by a chattel
mortgage was, immediately after the execution of the in-
strument, in the hands of the mortgagee, and the mort-
gagor "could draw on it at its own pleasure. There is no
evidence that the mortgage was executed for the purpose
of securing other sums to be thereafter advanced".55
In two later cases, however, each involving a building
association mortgagee, the question was seriously raised
and fully considered. In the case of Loan & Savings Assn.
v. Tracey,56 the mortgage was made with the distinct un-
derstanding that the sum so borrowed should be expended
solely in the erection of houses, and for assurance this
would be done, it was agreed between the mortgagor and
the agent of the mortgagee "that the money should be de-
posited with" the mortgagee, its withdrawal to be subject
to the control and supervision of the agent of the mort-
gagee.57 Accordingly, the mortgagor "was credited" by
the mortgagee with the full amount of the loan "which he
deposited with the mortgagee, and it was agreed between
Tracey and John H. Richardson, representing the Associa-
tion . . . that as the work on the houses progressed, cer-
tain amounts were to be paid on the approval of Mr. Rich-
ardson.'5 8  Richardson's testimony was to the effect that
he was to have control of the money and deposit it where
he pleased. He did deposit it with his principal. 51
The Court suggested that "for some reasons, it might
have been better to have deposited" the money in some
bank, and not to have left it with the mortgagee6 ° but up-
held the transaction as a present loan. As to the subse-
quent disposition of the balance, transferred from the
mortgagor to a builder, by the issuance of checks drawn on
" 86 Md. 595, 39 A. 314 (1898).
5 Ibid., 86 Md. 610, 39 A. 316.
.6 142 Md. 211, 120 A. 441 (1923).
7 Land Corporation v. Loan & Savings Ass'n., 138 Md. 529, 114 A. 469
(1921), an earlier phase of the Tracey case, in which the history of the
negotiations is reviewed.
142 Md. 211, 215, 120 A. 441. 442 (1923).
"Ibid., 142 Md. 218, 120 A. 444.
00 Ibid., 142 Md. 219, 120 A. 444.
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another bank, endorsed to the mortgagee for account of
the builder, and handled without presenting the checks, but
by a transfer by the mortgagee on its books of the funds
from the account of the mortgagor to that of the builder,
the Court considered that a presentation, cashing and rede-
posit would have been "an idle and unnecessary form."61
In the White Eagle Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Lumber Co.
case,62 the mortgage recited the receipt of $30,000, of which
only $2,250.25 was then paid to the mortgagor, "but, in ac-
cordance with an agreement made by and between the
mortgagor and mortgagee, contemporaneous with the exe-
cution and delivery of the mortgage, it was agreed that the
balance of the $30,000 should be retained by the mortgagee
and credited to the mortgagor on the books" of the associa-
tion, "to be used from time to time in payment of the con-
struction work upon the mortgaged property. '6 8  A side
agreement confirmed this, and authorized the mortgagee,
after completion of the buildings, to apply any surplus to
the mortgage, or to pay it over to the mortgagor. 4 The
case was treated as controlled by the Tracey decision, since
in both cases "the money was left with the Association to
the credit of the mortgagor, to be expended in improve-
ments upon the mortgaged premises" upon the approval
of a third person.65 The fact that in the Tracey case three
checks for part of the consideration were passed to the
mortgagor, who endorsed and returned them, while here
the whole consideration, less $2,500, "was left with the
mortgagee to the credit of the mortgagor" was considered
no ground of distinction. 66
61 Ibid., 142 Md. 220, 120 A. 444.
62168 Md. 199, 178 A. 214 (1934).6 3 Ibid., 168 Md. 203-4, 178 A. 215.
04 Ibid., 168 Md. 204, 178 A. 215.
"Ibid., 168 Md. 208, 178 A. 217.
66 Ibid., 168 Md. 209, 178 A. 217. Although analogies, particularly when
drawn from another field, are dangerous, yet might not the question of
whether the funds alleged to be held by the mortgagee are really those of
the mortgagor, in the custody of the mortgagee, or simply a promise to
advance in the future, be tested by the consequence of an unjustifiable
failure by the mortgagee to make payments in accordance with the
schedule? In the former case this would probably constitute embezzle-
ment; In the latter, simply breach of contract.
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C. If the mortgage is in reality for future advances,
an attempt to have the transaction take the form of an
indemnity mortgage will be ineffective. The case of High
Grade Brick Co. v. Amos67 was an ingenious68 but unsuc-
cessful attempt to use this device.
Spalding and another owned land which they wished
to have developed, retaining ground rents. They made a
bonus building arrangement with Amos, agreeing to pay
a bonus of $40,000 in installments, and to advance $35,800
for materials, to be secured by mortgages. To avoid per-
sonal liability on the covenants in the lease, D was used as
a straw man-a customary arrangement. D who was a
day laborer of Amos, was further used in the scheme, of
which he understood nothing, on the assurance that "he
would get into no trouble." The land was leased to D, and
the following papers were simultaneously executed:
1. An agreement that D would erect the buildings, and
Spalding would pay him the $40,000 bonus. Amos guar-
anteed this contract.
2. An agreement between Amos and D by which Amos
agreed to sell D all materials needed for construction, and
D agreed to procure Spalding to guarantee payment for
materials up to $700 per house.
3. A guaranty by Spalding to Amos, of the payment
by D for materials.
4. An order on Spalding by D to pay Amos "all sums
of money due on account of my agreement with you for an
advance in and about the erection of the houses."
5. A mortgage from D to Spalding, reciting a present
indebtedness, maturing in one year, in an amount equalling
the guaranty to Amos for materials, "and also to indemnify
[Spalding] against loss under their guaranty to Amos of
payment for building materials to be sold by him to" D.
This was construed by the Court to be a mortgage "to se-
cure the return to the mortgagees of such sums of money,
to the extent therein mentioned, as they should thereafter
"6 95 Md. 571, 52 A. 582 (1902).
6S The Chancellor thought the arrangement to be entirely regular, 2 Balt.
C. Rep. 226 (1902).
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advance to the builder of the houses in the course of the
construction thereof."6 9
Amos admitted that he, not D, was the real party in
interest, and that his name could properly be substituted
for D throughout. The guaranties were considered ficti-
tious, and the mortgage invalid against subsequent cred-
itors of Amos without knowledge, 0 since it failed to afford
"accurate and reliable information as to the extent of the
liens thereon and the times from which they became ef-
fective." 71
CONCLUSION
Whether or not our whole theory of mortgages should
be reconsidered and revised, it is submitted that some revi-
sion of Sections 2 and 3 of Article 66 is in order. If those
sections are, as they appear to be both from their language
and statutory history, mutually independent, it is doubtful
if conditions in Baltimore and Prince George's Counties
are so essentially different, in the field of mortgages, at
least, as to justify different treatment. If in fact the theory
of restriction on future advances is sound, why should it
be possible to protect such advances by the use of a deed
of trust, or a confession of judgment with an agreement to
make advances? If creditors should be entitled to know
the maximum amount for which a mortgage is to be secur-
ity, why should not this apply to indemnity mortgages as
well? There seems either to have been an unconsidered
series of efforts to remedy special conditions, without ade-
quate perspective of the whole field, or a sacrifice of sub-
stance for form.
11 High Grade Brick Co. v. Amos, 95 Md. 571, 588, 52 A. 582, 585, 53 A.
148 (1902).7 0 Ibid., 95 Md. 600, 53 A. 149.
71 Ibid., 95 Md. 591, 52 A. 586.
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